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Ingroup favoritism—the tendency to favor members of one’s own group over those in
other groups—is well documented, but the mechanisms driving this behavior are not
well understood. In particular, it is unclear to what extent ingroup favoritism is driven by
preferences concerning the welfare of ingroup over outgroup members, vs. beliefs about
the behavior of ingroup and outgroup members. In this review we analyze research on
ingroup favoritism in economic games, identifying key gaps in the literature and providing
suggestions on how future work can incorporate these insights to shed further light
on when, why, and how ingroup favoritism occurs. In doing so, we demonstrate how
social psychological theory and research can be integrated with findings from behavioral
economics, providing new theoretical and methodological directions for future research.
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Across many different contexts, people act more prosocially
towards members of their own group relative to those outside
their group. Consequently, a number of scientific disciplines
concerned with human cognition and behavior have sought
to explain such ingroup favoritism (also known as parochial
altruism). Here we explore to what extent ingroup favoritism
is driven by preferences concerning the welfare of ingroup over
outgroup members, vs. beliefs about the (future) behavior of
ingroup and outgroup members.
In this theoretical review we combine insights from a
behavioral economic approach with knowledge from social
psychological research on social identity processes in intergroup
behavior to explain the proximate psychological causes of ingroup
favoritism. We expand upon previous discussions about ingroup
favoritism by using a conceptual framework of preferences
and beliefs to review present findings demonstrating ingroup
favoritism in economic games. Although we focus on economic
games here, we also selectively draw upon other related research
to highlight how social-psychological theory and research can
be incorporated with findings from behavioral economics to
provide exciting new directions for research. We therefore provide
an integrative review of ingroup favoritism in economic games,
identifying key gaps in the literature, as well as providing
suggestions on how future work can incorporate these insights
to shed further light on when, why, and how ingroup favoritism
occurs.
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND GROUP BEHAVIOR
From the dawn of our species to the present day, humans
have lived, eaten, worked, and reproduced—that is, survived—
in groups. These groups have expanded from small, primarily
kin-based ties to groups based on language, nationality, religion,
current geographical location, and even seemingly arbitrary
characteristics such as the ownership of a particular brand of
electronic device. As a species, we appear to have a remarkable
tendency to seek out and identify with groups, and it has been
suggested that cooperation with the ingroup and competition
with the outgroup may have co-evolved (c.f. Rusch, 2014). Indeed,
it is in our group-based character that the angels and demons
of human nature can be seen: on the one hand, the success of
intragroup cooperation that has given us democracy and civil
rights; and on the other hand, the darkness of intergroup conflict
that has given us the collective stains on human history of
genocide and war.
The concept of social identity (Tajfel, 1970, 1974, 1982) is
key to this review—and more broadly most contemporary social
psychological work on intergroup processes. Social identity is
“that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from
his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups)
together with the value and emotional significance attached
to that membership” (Tajfel, 1974, p. 69). We use here the
definition of a group from work on intergroup relations in
social psychology: a social group is a collection of individuals
who perceive themselves to be members of the same social
category, and therefore share a social identity (Tajfel and Turner,
1979; Turner et al., 1987; Ellemers et al., 2002; Ellemers and
Haslam, 2011; Turner and Reynolds, 2011). Social groups can
be based on a range of objective and subjective criteria—from
ethnic background to gender to nationality to occupation to
religion. An intergroup context emerges when social identities
are salient and individuals interact with one another in terms
of these social group identities (Turner et al., 1987). Indeed,
even assignment to random groups can be sufficient to engender
a relevant intergroup context in which intergroup behavior is
observed (Tajfel, 1974). Once groups have been formed, how does
this influence behavior?
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A number of theories have been posited to explain intergroup
behavior, including but not limited to the social identity
approach (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987); the
social exchange and reciprocity model (Yamagishi et al., 1999;
Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008); coalitional and tribal instinct-
based models (Van Vugt and Schaller, 2008; Van Vugt and Park,
2010); uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg and Abrams, 1993;
Hogg, 2000); social dominance theory (Pratto, 1999; Sidanius and
Pratto, 1999); and various evolutionary models (e.g., Choi and
Bowles, 2007; Fu et al., 2012). With regard to ingroup favoritism
specifically, two accounts dominate. On the one hand is the largely
preference-based social identity approach generally favored in
traditional social psychology (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner
et al., 1987), while on the other is a largely belief-based theory
of bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) generally favored by
behavioral economists (Yamagishi et al., 1999; Yamagishi and
Kiyonari, 2000). Given its prominence in social psychology—
and relatively low profile in behavioral economics—we begin
by providing a brief overview of the key tenets of the social
identity approach to intergroup processes, while also directing
the interested reader to existing comprehensive reviews of the
theory (e.g., Ellemers and Haslam, 2011; Turner and Reynolds,
2011).
The social identity approach aims to address three core
aspects of intergroup behavior: the psychological processes that
lead to social identities; the different strategies that people use
to derive and maintain a positive social identity; and the key
characteristics of the social structure that determine which of
these strategies are likely to be used in any given case. The
social identity approach posits that a key psychological process
underlying group phenomenon is self-categorization: people
come to interpret the social world as consisting of ingroups—
social groups to which the individual belongs—and outgroups—
social groups of which the individual is not a member (Tajfel et al.,
1971; Turner et al., 1987). More specifically, depersonalization
refers to the psychological process through which people come
to perceive the self as an interchangeable exemplar of a social
category, rather than a separate individual with unique traits
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). When individuals
categorize themselves as group members, the ingroup becomes
integrated with the self and individuals come to recognize the
characteristics of the ingroup as representing part of themselves
(Smith et al., 1999; Tropp and Wright, 2001). Depersonalization
has been argued to be the basis for group cohesion, interpersonal
attraction, and social cooperation (Hogg and Turner, 1985). A
social identity is integral to an individual’s sense of self, and this
self-categorization process has a number of cognitive, affective,
and evaluative dimensions that make it such a central part of
social life (Ellemers et al., 2002). Social psychological work has
demonstrated that compared with those low in identification,
individuals high in identification with a group are more likely
to think of themselves as ingroup members (e.g., Spears et al.,
1997), to feel connected to other ingroup members (e.g., Doosje
et al., 1995), to remain committed to their ingroup when faced
with threat (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1997), and to be concerned about
how their group is treated relative to other groups (e.g., Tropp and
Wright, 1999).
The social identity approach holds that identification with
one’s group motivates individuals to distinguish their group
from others to attain and preserve positive collective self-
esteem as a group member (Brewer, 1999). To create and
maintain a positive social identity, individuals can adopt one of
three main strategies: they can seek to escape, avoid, or deny
belonging to a devalued group (individual mobility); they can
seek to redefine the intergroup comparison by representing the
ingroup in terms of positive rather than negative characteristics
(social creativity); or they can engage in action designed to
change the standing of their group (social competition). One
of the most common ways of preserving a positive social
identity comes from the social competition strategy and involves
intergroup bias: the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own
group or its members more favorably than an outgroup
or its members (Tajfel, 1982). The social identity approach
suggests that these strategies will be differentially employed
based on the extent to which group members perceive the
group differences and boundaries to be permeable, stable,
and legitimate (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). As will be evident
in this review, most work considering ingroup favoritism
in economic games has focused on the social competition
strategy, and often ignored whether group members perceive the
social order to be permeable, stable, or legitimate, or whether
they engage in the strategies of individual mobility or social
creativity.
USING ECONOMIC GAMES TO EXPLORE PROSOCIAL
BEHAVIOR
In the social psychological tradition, prosocial behavior refers
to the performance of “a broad category of acts that are
defined by some significant segment of society and/or one’s
social group as generally beneficial to other people” (Penner
et al., 2005, p. 366). The most commonly discussed examples
of prosocial behavior include helping in emergency situations,
volunteering, and donating to charity: i.e., unidirectional
helping where a helper provides assistance to someone else in
need. However, prosocial behavior also includes bidirectional
social interactions—cooperation—where individuals are aware
of the benefits of pursuing the best joint outcomes for all
and coordinate their behavior accordingly (Dovidio et al.,
2006). Cooperation can be seen as paying a cost to give
a (typically greater) benefit to others. In this paper we
include both unidirectional helping (e.g., donating to charity)
and bidirectional helping (e.g., cooperation in public goods
games) under the heading of prosocial behavior: actions that
benefit others, often at some immediate cost to oneself.
Prosocial behavior has been studied using a range of methods.
In this paper we depart from previous reviews in social
psychology by focusing our discussion on one specific approach
to studying prosocial behavior that has been fruitful in
understanding prosocial behavior—namely, the use of economic
games.
Game theory—“the study of mathematical models of conflict
and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers”
(Myerson, 1991, p. 1)—provides an important tool for examining
human behavior. Game theory is concerned with the decision-
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making that occurs when one agent interacts with another agent,
and can be broadly divided into analytical game theory and
behavioral game theory (Camerer, 2003). Analytical game theory
often uses mathematical derivations to predict what agents (e.g.,
people) do in a specific interaction (e.g., an economic game),
and is often based on introspection, logic, and mathematical
formulae. In contrast, behavioral game theory concerns what
players actually do in real situations, and expands upon analytical
game theory by also considering the role of emotions, mistakes,
doubt, learning, and so on. Behavioral game theory is therefore a
branch of economics that explicitly uses psychological regularity
(e.g., biases) to extend theories of behavior (Camerer, 2003).
With roots in both behavioral game theory and psychology,
a number of behavioral economic games have been developed
and utilized in research. Economic games allow researchers to
explore, in tightly controlled experiments, how people make
real choices concerning resource distribution. In particular, they
are designed with the intent of precisely specifying processes
affecting decision making in a way that helps to eliminate
any potential external confounding variables, prioritizing tight
control of variables over ecological validity. The core feature of
economic games is their simplicity, where one player usually has
a strictly dominant strategy if he is self-interested, and where
this selfish strategy is salient and easy to understand in all cases.
If and when a player does not choose this selfish strategy we
can infer that they deliberately did not do so—that they had
some other motive (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). One important
concept is in economic theory is utility, which refers to the
perceived ability of something to satisfy needs or wants—that
is, to be happiness-producing. Another important concept in
game theory is that of the Nash equilibrium: a solution concept
of a set of strategies in a non-cooperative game whereby each
player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other
players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only
their own strategy. Put simply, a group of players are in a Nash
equilibrium if each one is making the best decision that he or
she can, taking into account that the others are also doing their
best.
Of special importance to this review are the concepts of
preferences and beliefs. These are central components of the
behavioral economic approach to social behavior, and this
conceptual apparatus provides an effective tool for examining
the causal mechanisms behind prosocial behavior. Preferences
refer to a person’s dispositions towards certain behaviors and
outcomes based on the utility expected to be derived from
them, while beliefs refer to the expectations that people have
about uncertain outcomes in a game (Camerer, 2003). Real-
world prosocial behavior is subject to a range of psychological
influences that make examining the distinct power of preference-
and belief-based processes difficult. Consider the example from
the Biblical parable of the Good Samaritan, where a man helps
a wounded stranger on the road. Did he help because he had a
strong motivation to do so? Did he help because he would feel
good by doing it? Did he help because he expected some future
reward? Did he help because people were watching and he wanted
to forge a good reputation? Did he help because he was reluctant
to violate social norms that endorse helping others in need? The
richness of real-world situations is in part what makes studying
prosocial behavior so fascinating, but this very richness also limits
the precise delineation of the relative influence of the different
contributing psychological processes of preferences and beliefs.
In this sense, economic games allow one to strip down situations
to more fully examine preferences and beliefs occurring, which
then gives greater insight into the real-world phenomenon at
hand.
As evident throughout the articles in this special issue,
there are a number of economic games used in research. To
avoid repetition, in Table 1 we provide a brief summary of
the most commonly used games used to study intergroup
prosocial behavior and the extent to which they measure
preferences and beliefs. Research using economic games to
study prosocial behavior has often used a small number of
specific games with slight modifications: the Tajfel Minimal
Group Paradigm Matrices (“Tajfel Matrices”: Tajfel, 1970); the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod,
1980); the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD; Bornstein and
Ben-Yossef, 1994); the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma Maximising
Difference (IPD-MD; Halevy et al., 2008); Common Pool Dilemmas
(CPD; Hardin, 1968; Messick et al., 1983); Public Goods
Dilemmas (PGD; Hardin, 1968; see Figure 1); the Dictator Game
(DG; Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994; see Figure 2);
the Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth et al., 1982: see Figure 3); and
the Trust Game (TG: Berg et al., 1995; see Figure 4).
PREFERENCES AND BELIEFS IN PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
PREFERENCES
Social preferences have been incorporated into the behavioral
economic approach to account for the finding that individuals do
help others even when it is against their interest (Camerer and
Fehr, 2004). Put simply, in addition to self-regarding preferences,
people have other-regarding social preferences concerning the
well being of others, fairness, and reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Camerer, 2003).
Social preferences are likely to have been evolutionarily
advantageous because cooperation was typically in our long-
term best interest. Were we to engage in a cost-benefit analysis
of the pros and cons of moving away from a predator every
time we encountered one, we would rather quickly end up dead.
Rather, it is efficient for humans to have developed intuitive
motivations that align with the behavior that is—in general—
fitness maximizing. Humans must be equipped biologically to
function effectively in many social situations without excessive
reliance on cognitive processes, and so pro-social preferences are
likely to be part of human nature (Hoffman, 1981; Van Vugt
and Van Lange, 2006). It seems likely that some preferences for
prosocial behavior—especially towards group members, given
our kin-based evolutionary history—have developed because they
have been particularly evolutionarily advantageous. Indeed, a
growing body of research suggests that people do indeed have
prosocial social preferences, with people exhibiting “intuitive
prosociality” (Rand et al., 2012; Zaki and Mitchell, 2013).
While slightly different categorizations of social preferences
exist in the literature, in this review we follow Fehr and
Schmidt (2006), who distinguish three types of other-regarding
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Table 1 | Commonly used behavioral economic games to study intergroup prosocial behavior.
Name Abbreviation Reference Brief description Preferences and beliefs
Common Pool
Dilemmas
CPD Hardin (1968),
Messick et al.
(1983)
A typical CPD might have four players and
a common pool consisting of a certain
number of points (e.g., 200 points). In
a round, each player can take up to 50
points. This amount is then halved and
earned by the player; the remaining money
gets split equally among all players.
In a CPD, prosocial behavior can be
attributed to some combination of
preferences (e.g., a motivation to
help the other players) or beliefs
(e.g., believing that prosocial
behavior will be reciprocated in
future).
Dictator Game DG Kahneman et al.
(1986), Forsythe
et al. (1994)
One player—the dictator—makes a
unilateral decision about how to divide
an amount of money with a second
player—the recipient. The dictator is able
to allocate any amount of money to the
recipient—from nothing to the entire
amount—and the recipient must accept
this amount.
In principle, the DG excludes
any role of beliefs, since the
experimental set-up is described
in a way that makes it clear that
there can be no reciprocity or
interdependence of outcomes;
the dictator has complete
power over the situation and
the recipient must accept whatever
amount the dictator decides.
Therefore, behavior in the DG can
be interpreted as resulting primarily
from social preferences.
Intergroup
Prisoner’s
Dilemma
IPD Bornstein and
Ben-Yossef
(1994)
In this game there are two groups, with
three members in each group. Each player
receives an endowment of two monetary
units, and is informed that they can either
keep this unit or contribute it to a common
pool. For every contribution, each ingroup
member (including the contributor) gains
one unit and each outgroup member
loses one unit. Three key strategies
can be discerned. First, individuals can
play according to the individual strategy,
where individually the best strategy is
to not contribute anything because the
individual’s return from contributing 2 units
is only 1 unit. Second, individuals can play
according to the ingroup strategy, where
the dominant group strategy is for all group
members to contribute; this is because
group-wide contribution generates a total
of 3 units for the ingroup while costing
it only 2 units. Third, individuals can
play according to the collectively optimal
strategy, where because the ingroup’s
gain from contribution is exactly offset by
the outgroup’s loss, contribution is a net
waste of units from the collective point
of view, and so the collectively optimal
strategy—the one that maximizes the
payoff of both groups and all players—is
for all players to defect.
Prosocial behavior can be
attributed to some combination of
preferences (e.g., ingroup love or
outgroup derogation) and beliefs
(e.g., adherence to social norms of
cooperation; expectations of future
reciprocity).
Intergroup
Prisoner’s
Dilemma—
Maximizing
Difference
IPD-MD Halevy et al.
(2008)
In the IPD-MD, group members are able
to direct their contributions to one of
two pools: a between-group pool, or a
within-group pool.The between-group
pool parallels the original IPD whereby an
increase in the payoffs to each ingroup
member by 1 unit decreases the payoff to
Prosocial behavior can be
attributed to some combination of
preferences (e.g., ingroup love or
outgroup derogation) and beliefs
(e.g., adherence to social norms of
cooperation; expectations of future
reciprocity).
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Name Abbreviation Reference Brief description Preferences and beliefs
each outgroup member by 1 unit. In contrast,
the within-group pool increases the payoffs to
each ingroup member by 1 unit but has no
effect on the outgroup. Contribution to the
within-group pool indicates ingroup love—the
cooperative motivation to increase the ingroup’s
payoff. In contrast, contribution to the between-
group pool indicates outgroup derogation—the
aggressive motivation to hurt the outgroup (or the
competitive motivation to increase the ingroup’s
relative payoff).
Minimal Group
Paradigm
Matrices
Tajfel
Matrices
Tajfel (1970) The Tajfel Matrices require individuals to distribute
points between other participants who are
identifiable only by code number and their group
membership (e.g., “participant number 34 from
Group A”). Participants are informed that after
the task was finished, they will receive the total
number of points that had been allocated to them
by the other participants. Participants tend to
allocate points according to three main strategies:
aiming for maximum joint profit of all players, for
maximum profit for the ingroup, or for maximum
difference in points between the ingroup and
outgroup.
Participants cannot allocate points
to themselves, which was intended
to eliminate direct reciprocity.
Therefore, in theory the Tajfel
matrices allow the researcher to
isolate the contribution of social
preferences to ingroup favoritism in
economic games.
Prisoner’s
Dilemma
PD Rapoport and
Chammah
(1965), Axelrod
(1980)
In this game, players (the “prisoners”) can choose
to cooperate or defect. If players both cooperate,
they achieve a good outcome. However, if
one player defects while the other cooperates,
the defector gets the highest payoff, and the
cooperator gets the lowest payoff—giving both
players an incentive to defect. If both defect,
both do poorly, and so the PD demonstrates the
tension that lies between individual rationality
(reflected in the incentive of both sides to be
selfish) and group rationality (reflected in the
higher payoff to both sides for mutual cooperation
over mutual defection)
Cooperation can arise from a
genuine desire to cooperate with
the other player (preferences), the
expectation that the other person is
likely to cooperate and so it makes
sense for you to also cooperate
(beliefs), or some combination of
the two.
Public Goods
Dilemmas
PGD Hardin (1968) A typical experimental PGD has four participants
who choose how many points to contribute to a
common project. The points that are contributed
are then multiplied by some amount from 0.25 to
1 and then redistributed equally to each player.
As with other social dilemmas, in
a PGD prosocial behavior can be
seen to arise from preferences and
beliefs.
Trust Game TG Berg et al. (1995) This game has two participants: an investor and
a trustee. The investor is given some money and
told that they must send a proportion (from zero
to the full amount) of this money to the trustee,
and that the experimenter will multiply the money
by some amount. Once the trustee receives the
money, they are told that they must send back a
portion of it to the investor, again ranging from
zero to the full amount.
With its focus on trust, for the
first mover in a one-shot game,
behavior is likely to be driven by
both preferences and beliefs. In
particular, behavior is likely to be
motivated by expectations about
whether the second player will
return any money, and whether this
probabilistic outcome justifies the
potential gain in winnings.
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Name Abbreviation Reference Brief description Preferences and beliefs
For the second mover in a one-shot
trust game, however, behavior is likely
to be driven primarily by preferences:
does the person want to return some
money back to the first player? The
trust game, then, taps a mixture of
preferences and beliefs.
Ultimatum Game UG Güth et al. (1982) One player (the proposer) receives an amount
of money and makes a proposal to the other
player (the responder) regarding how to divide
the money between them. If the responder
accepts the proposed split, both players receive
the allocated money. However, unlike the DG, the
responder has the option to reject the proposed
split, leading both players to receive nothing.
Prosocial behavior by the proposer in
the UG can be attributed to a mixture
of social preferences and beliefs, as
they gauge both how much they would
like to offer, but also the likelihood
that such an offer would be accepted.
Meanwhile, prosocial behavior by
the responder, who decides whether
to accept or reject the offer, can
be interpreted as resulting from
preferences alone.
social preferences (henceforth simply “social preferences” or
“preferences”): outcome-dependent; reciprocal; and type-
dependent.
Outcome dependent social preferences
The simplest kinds of social preferences are outcome-dependent,
in the sense that they concern only the payoffs to self and
others. There are several different types of outcome-dependent
social preferences. Positive outcome-dependent social preferences
(“altruism”) refer to increases in positive utility for the self
associated with gains to others: a person gains satisfaction as
another person gains something positive. By contrast, negative
outcome-dependent social preferences (“spite”) refer to decreases
in positive utility for the self associated with gains to others:
a person loses satisfaction as another person gains something
positive. Efficiency is a preference for outcomes that maximize
the sum total of payoffs to all players, regardless of how those
payoffs are distributed (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Capraro,
2013). Finally, inequity aversion refers to decreases in positive
utility for self as material payoffs to others become more
inequitable (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Inequity aversion can take the
form of either advantageous inequity aversion or disadvantageous
inequity aversion. Advantageous inequity aversion occurs when an
individual gains positive utility from giving up some economic
benefit to move in the direction of more equitable outcome:
an individual perceives that they have a disproportionately high
amount of a resource and desires to redistribute this accordingly.
Disadvantageous inequity aversion occurs when an individual
experiences negative utility (i.e., dissatisfaction) from their lack
of resource compared to another, and gains positive utility with
redistribution in the direction of more equitable outcomes.
Reciprocal social preferences
The second type of social preferences concerns the fair or unfair
behavior of other agents in the game—commonly referred to as
FIGURE 1 | Public Goods Dilemmas require participants to choose how
many points to contribute to a common project. The points that are
contributed are then doubled and then redistributed equally to each player.
FIGURE 2 | The Dictator Game has two players. One player—the
dictator—makes a unilateral decision of how to divide an amount of money
with a second player—the recipient.
reciprocity, and exemplified in the Biblical injunction of an “eye
for eye” (Leviticus 24:19–21). Here, individual’s positive utility
becomes greater as behavior is seen to be reciprocal. Reciprocity
refers to the motivation to respond with kindness towards actions
perceived to be kind (positive reciprocity) and with unkindness
towards actions perceived to be hostile (negative reciprocity). A
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FIGURE 3 | The Ultimatum Game has two players. One player (the
proposer) receives an amount of money and makes a proposal to the other
player (the responder) regarding how to divide the money between them. If
the responder accepts the proposed split, both players receive the allocated
money. However, unlike the DG, the responder has the option to reject the
proposed split, leading both players to receive nothing.
FIGURE 4 | The Trust Game has two participants, an investor (Person
A) and a trustee (Person B). Person A is given some money and told that
they must send a proportion (from zero to the full amount) of this money to
Person B, and that the experimenter will multiply the money by some
amount. Once Person B receives the money, they are told that they must
send back a portion of it to Player A, again ranging from zero to the full
amount.
person’s utility function to help another who has helped them,
therefore, will be greater than the desire to help a person who
previously has not helped. Such social preferences do not only
depend on the allocations of resources, but also on the perceived
intentions behind an action (Falk et al., 2003). It is important to
note that such reciprocal preferences are distinct from a belief-
based process as it is not future material benefits or reward that
drive behavior, but rather a preference for reciprocity. Reciprocal
preferences occur even in anonymous one-shot economic games
where there is no possibility of future reward. This preference-
based reciprocity is often referred to as “strong reciprocity”, to be
contrasted with the “weak reciprocity” driven by strategic self-
interested considerations in repeated interactions (Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
Type-dependent social preferences
The third type of social preferences are type-dependent: an
individual behaves kindly towards a “good” person with perceived
altruistic preferences and with hostility towards a “bad” person
with spiteful preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Such type-
dependent preferences may change an individual’s utility function
to engage in prosocial behavior: the perception of the other
person as “bad” reduces one’s desire to help them, while the
perception of the other person as “good” increases one’s desire
to help them. Note that while connected to beliefs (perceptions of
character depend on cognitive evaluations about the person and
their behavior) such an explanation importantly differs from a
belief-based process. For type-dependent social preferences, the
suggestion is that the perceived “type” of outgroup members
makes people less motivated to act prosocially towards them
(preferences), rather than strategically determining that it would
be disadvantageous to help them (beliefs).
BELIEFS
In the context of economic games, beliefs are the expectations
that people have about uncertain outcomes in a game. While
preferences refer to an individual’s own inclinations and desires
to act prosocially, beliefs typically focus on the other player
and the context in which the game is played. Evidence suggests
that strategic beliefs concerning whether cooperative behavior
will be reciprocated—and thus whether it is advantageous—
are an important driver in observations of prosocial behavior
(Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Blanco et al., 2014). Such
strategic beliefs can come in different forms, which are detailed
below.
Overall, the importance of strategic beliefs in explaining
prosocial behavior is paralleled by the cost-reward analysis of
emergency helping (Piliavin and Piliavin, 1972; Piliavin et al.,
1981; Dovidio et al., 1991), which holds that people are motivated
to maximize their rewards while minimizing their costs, and so
in emergency situations weigh the probable costs and rewards of
alternative courses of action before deciding on a decision that
will result in the best personal outcome for them.
Outcome dependence and direct reciprocity
First, an individual may have beliefs about direct reciprocity
and outcome dependance, where the individual is aware that by
helping another person, that person is likely to help them back
in return, thus being strategically advantageous for both parties.
While perceived outcome dependence occurs in some games (e.g.,
the original Tajfel matrices), many one-shot economic games do
not allow for direct reputation building outside the experimental
context. In contrast, within social groups, one-shot interactions
are rare and interactions occur within a repeated and ongoing
context.
Reputational concerns and indirect reciprocity
Second, an individual may have beliefs about indirect reciprocity:
expectations about the likelihood of having prosocial behavior
paid back to oneself by another person at a later time (Alexander,
1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, 2005). For example, a person
may lend money to a neighbor not due to any preferences to do
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so, but because they judge it would be strategically advantageous
to have a generalized positive reputation amongst their neighbors
because at some point they are likely to need help from a neighbor
themselves. Evolutionary accounts positing a reputation-based
theory of cooperation in groups argue that through being
helpful in situations where others know that the helper will not
benefit directly, the person builds a reputation of being someone
trustworthy, thus enhancing evolutionary fitness. Milinski et al.
found that when reputation building was allowed for in a public
goods paradigm, participants cooperated more and so were more
productive: “the “tragedy of the commons” was no longer a
tragedy; instead, the commons became productive and could be
harvested” (Milinski et al., 2002, p. 426). Helping in an economic
game is affected both by the image score of the recipient and
the image score of the donor: that is, donors with higher image
scores help more, particularly for recipients who also have good
reputations (Seinen and Schram, 2006). Similarly, Croson (2007)
has conducted a set of social dilemma experiments to test between
the commitment, social preferences, and reciprocity explanations
of prosocial behavior, and found strong support for reciprocity
over the other two theories. Indeed, some work has suggested
that in PGDs, cooperation can be utilized as a reputational
strategy and that the benefits of the action to the society at
large can sometimes be of secondary importance (Van Vugt and
Hardy, 2010). Indirect reciprocity—reputation building—is an
important factor in explaining prosocial behavior in economic
games (Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004).
Cooperative norm violation
Thirdly, strategic beliefs can be connected to social norms,
whereby people act more prosocially towards group members
because they perceive that to be the socially approved form of
action and are aware of the costs of violating such norms (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004a).
INGROUP FAVORITISM
Having outlined the conceptual framework of preferences and
beliefs, we now describe in detail how this framework can help
to elucidate the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism. A number
of experimental studies, using adults in both real and artificial
groups in economic games, have found that intragroup prosocial
behavior is consistently higher than intergroup prosocial behavior:
i.e., people consistently act more prosocially towards ingroup
members than outgroup members. Social identity appears to
influence prosocial behavior even in young children: 3–7 year
old children exhibit greater generosity towards ingroup members
than outgroup members across a series of economic games (Fehr
et al., 2008), and 6 year old children punish third-party selfishness
more harshly when it comes from an outgroup member and
when it disadvantages ingroup members (Jordan et al., 2014b). It
has been shown that the presence of a subtle cue of relatedness
facilitates group cooperation in a PGD (Krupp et al., 2008)
and that highlighting relatedness promotes general prosocial
motives and behavior in a DG-like charitable donation game
(Pavey et al., 2011). Experimentally making social identity salient
leads to ingroup favoritism in the UG, for both the responder
and proposer roles (McLeish and Oxoby, 2011), and white
responders higher on implicit racial bias discriminate against
Black individuals in an UG, accepting more offers from other
White participants than Black participants, even at a cost to
their own financial gain (Kubota et al., 2013). Even artificially
created minimal groups exhibit ingroup favoritism: in the PD
(Ahmed, 2007); the Tajfel Matrices (Tajfel, 1970); the IPD-
MD (Halevy et al., 2012); and PGDs and CPDs (Kramer and
Brewer, 1984; Brewer and Kramer, 1986). Such findings have
also been observed in the field—in a DG in post-conflict Bosnia
(Whitt and Wilson, 2007), and in PGDs in both homogenous
and heterogeneous communities in Uganda (Habyarimana et al.,
2007). Finally, this pattern is even exhibited in non-human
primates: capuchin monkeys, for example, have been observed to
act prosocially selectively towards ingroup members in a simple
resource distribution task (de Waal et al., 2008).
Much empirical research demonstrating ingroup favoritism
has been conducted using the principle of recategorization
(Gaertner et al., 1993): if group membership boundaries are
modified, do our parochial boundaries of prosocial behavior
change? The creation of a common ingroup identity has been
shown to lead to increased helping behavior (Nier et al., 2001)
and support for more cooperative intergroup policies (Beaton
et al., 2008). Using economic games, Kramer and Brewer (1984)
conducted three CPD experiments to assess the effects of making
salient either a superordinate or subordinate group identity
and found that individuals were most cooperative when a
superordinate identity was salient. Such results were found again
by the same researchers using a PGD (Brewer and Kramer, 1986),
and have received support by a number of other researchers using
similar manipulations. Using artificial experimental groups, de
Cremer and Stouten (2003) have found that once people develop
a common social identity this shared identity leads to more trust
and cooperation in a PGD, and selfish individuals in a public
goods game can be encouraged to cooperate by increasing the
salience of their common ingroup identity (de Cremer and Van
Vugt, 1999). In further support, Wit and Kerr (2002) have found
that members of artificial groups exhibited greater cooperation
in social dilemma games upon recategorization to a collective
common ingroup identity. Finally, such principles have been
demonstrated in real groups by Rand et al. (2009).
Across multiple games, by a number of different researchers,
using different groups and populations, the behavioral
observation of ingroup favoritism has been well documented.
Our prosocial tendencies, in other words, are parochial. Why
might this ingroup favoritism occur?
PREFERENCES IN INGROUP FAVORITISM
With regards to ingroup favoritism, preference-based accounts
of ingroup favoritism cohere around the notion that group
membership alters an individual’s social preferences in economic
games: intergroup processes change people’s desires and
inclinations concerning the outcomes of ingroup and outgroup
members. In economic terms, identity influences an individual’s
utility function (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). In this section we
discuss how group membership may relate to the three types
of preference-based accounts distinguished above: positive and
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negative social preferences over others’ outcomes, reciprocity,
and type-dependent preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). In
general, preference-based accounts of ingroup favoritism align
well with the social identity approach.
OUTCOME-DEPENDENT SOCIAL PREFERENCES
Ingroup love
One of the most prominent preference-based explanations of
ingroup favoritism in social psychology is rooted in work
from the social identity approach and posits that people
simply have a stronger desire—i.e., a social preference—to help
ingroup members relative to outgroup members. To use Brewer
(1999) terminology, individuals exhibit greater prosocial behavior
towards other ingroup members relative to outgroup members
in economic games because they show ingroup love, brought
about by categorization processes of depersonalization. On the
ingroup love account, identifying with a group leads to ingroup
favoritism because the individual’s own interests become more
aligned with the interests of the group collective, thus enhancing
the desire to help others—just as one would want to help oneself
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Turner et al.,
1987). Simpson (2006) provides evidence that ingroup favoritism
stems from an increase in how actors weigh the payoffs to fellow
ingroup members rather than through changes in expectations
about fellow ingroup members’ actions.
One way of empirically testing the ingroup love hypothesis
comes from work on relative group identification. If ingroup
favoritism arises through depersonalization-based social
preferences where the ingroup is included within the self,
individuals who identify more strongly with their group should
also be those that act more prosocially towards ingroup members.
Indeed, greater attachment to a group—and so presumably
greater depersonalization—has been shown to be associated
with greater cooperation in a PGD (de Cremer, 2002). When
taking part in a PGD in which cooperation is breaking down,
high group identifiers given an attractive exit option to leave
the game exhibit a significantly greater desire to remain in the
group (to restore cooperation), even when this is against their
own economic best interests (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004). It
seems that because high group identifiers had a stronger sense
of we-ness that triggered greater concern for the outcomes of
other members of the group too, they were more likely to remain
cooperative.
Further support is found in research on empathy, the complex
and multifaceted ability to share the emotional states of others
(Preston and de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 2008). The empathy-
altruism hypothesis explicitly explains prosocial behavior in terms
of empathy-based altruistic preferences, where the perception of
another person’s need in conjunction with a special interpersonal
relationship to that person (based on, for example, group
membership) evokes empathy, which in turn increases altruistic
motivations (e.g., Batson, 1991; Batson and Shaw, 1991).
Accordingly, empathic social preferences are known to have
general prosocial effects in economic games. For example,
empathy sustains cooperation in a PGD (Rumble et al., 2010),
and participants induced to feel empathic concern in a PD
tend to show higher levels of cooperative responses (Batson
and Moran, 1999)—even when they know that their partner
has already made a competitive choice (Batson and Ahmad,
2001). Work using neuroscientific methods has provided further
empirical support for this by demonstrating an intergroup
empathy bias: the tendency to empathize more with ingroup
relative to outgroup members, (Cikara et al., 2014). Studies
using functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) report that people
show more neural activation in pain and empathy circuits when
observing the pain of an ingroup member, compared to an
outgroup member (Xu et al., 2009; Chiao and Mathur, 2010;
Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2010, 2012; Cheon et al., 2011). Such
findings support the claim that the interests of ingroup members
have become adopted—to a degree—as the interests of the
self. In an intergroup setting, Mathur et al. have demonstrated
both that the neural responses within regions associated with
empathy are heightened for the pain of ingroup relative to
outgroup members and further that this relative neural activity
predicts altruistic motivation for one’s ingroup in the form
of paying more to help ingroup members (Mathur et al.,
2010). Of particular importance is work from Hein et al., who
investigated the neural processes that preceded the willingness
to engage in costly helping toward ingroup and outgroup
members. Participants were able to choose to help an ingroup
or outgroup member by enduring physical pain themselves to
reduce the other’s pain. Hein et al. found that helping the
ingroup member was best predicted by anterior insula activity—
an area known to be critical for empathy. In contrast, lack of
help to the outgroup member was best predicted by nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) activity—an area associated with reward
processing and aggression (Hein et al., 2010). It seems, then,
that ingroup-favoring preferences are an important driver of
the effects of social identity on prosocial behavior in economic
games: social identification increases prosocial behavioral by
reducing actors’ tendency to draw distinctions between their
own and others’ welfare, such that a member of a group
may get positive utility when the total welfare of his group
increases.
Outgroup derogation
The counterpart to the positive social preference of ingroup
love is the negative social preference for outgroup derogation,
or outgroup hate (Hewstone et al., 2002). It is known that in
addition to positive social preferences for prosocial behavior,
some individuals exhibit spite, having social preferences for
negative outcomes of others—for example, punishing prosocial
behavior in others (Anderson and Putterman, 2006). To what
extent can outgroup derogation explain ingroup favoritism in
economic games?
Neuroimaging and behavioral data suggests that in addition
to positive social preferences for ingroup members, people
may experience pleasure in response to out-group members’
adversities (Schadenfreude) and displeasure in response to their
triumphs (Glückschmerz, Leach et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2009;
Cikara et al., 2011). Indeed, on both theoretical and empirical
grounds, such negative counter-empathic responses are distinct
from ingroup love-based ingroup empathy (Cikara et al., 2014).
With regards to empathic responses, it has been argued that the
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intergroup empathy bias may be better explained by negative
counter-empathic responses towards outgroups, rather than
ingroup love (Cikara et al., 2014). An individual, therefore,
may lose positive utility when the total welfare of an outgroup
increases.
Alongside this, however, a growing body of research suggests
that, by and large, ingroup love may be a more potent driver
of intergroup relations than outgroup derogation (Mummendey
and Otten, 1998; Hewstone et al., 2002). Of particular importance
is work by Halevy et al. (2012), who explored the role of
preference-based ingroup love and outgroup derogation in
explaining ingroup favoritism using the IPD-MD. They found
that group members were not competitive or aggressive per se,
and that when given the choice participants strongly preferred
to cooperate to maximize their absolute group gains, rather
than compete against the outgroup for relative gain. Further,
their results revealed that ingroup love prevails over outgroup
derogation even after intergroup conflict (Halevy et al., 2012).
Research using alternative PD matrices has shown that ingroup
favoritism arises even in the absence of an outgroup and
intergroup comparison, suggesting that ingroup love is more
potent in driving in ingroup favoritism than outgroup derogation
(Gaertner et al., 2006). Most recently, meta-analytic findings
from Balliet et al. (2014) show that the effects of ingroup love
are stronger than outgroup derogation in explaining ingroup
favoritism.
Overall, evidence suggests that both positive and negative
social preferences concerning outcomes play a role in leading
to ingroup favoritism—but that positive social preferences for
ingroup love may play a stronger role than negative social
preferences for outgroup derogation.
Inequity aversion
Advantageous inequity aversion may be more prevalent in
exchanges with ingroup members due to a desire to minimize
within-group differences (Turner et al., 1987). When engaging
in exchanges with outgroup members, however, a competitive
desire to maximize ingroup payoffs relative to the outgroup may
predominate over inequity-based feelings of guilt for outgroup
members. Advantageous inequity aversion, therefore, might be
moderated by group membership such that increased guilt is felt
when a group member has a disproportionate share of resources
compared to other group members. Evidence for such group-
moderated advantageous inequity aversion was found by Chen
and Li (2009), who used a series of simple economic games
including the DG and Tajfel Matrices, and found that participants
gave 47% more in charitable redistributions to ingroup relative
to outgroup members. Similarly, participants experienced less
disadvantageous inequity aversion when an ingroup member
(compared with an outgroup member) received a higher payoff
than they themselves did. Chen and Li’s findings suggest that both
advantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion play a role in
ingroup favoritism.
RECIPROCITY
The second type of social preferences concerns the fair or
unfair behavior of other agents in a game, where an individual’s
positive utility becomes greater as behavior is seen to be more
reciprocal. Positive reciprocity appears to be moderated by
group membership, with Chen and Li (2009) finding that group
members were 19% more likely to respond prosocially to (that
is, reward) an ingroup member for good behavior compared
to an outgroup member. While research on this is relatively
scarce, it seems that social preferences for positive reciprocity
may be more pronounced among group members, such that
ingroup members are rewarded more for prosocial behavior than
outgroup members.
Group membership also seems to be an important factor
in negative reciprocity. One well-studied form of negative
reciprocity is altruistic punishment—the social preference to
punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, even when
it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid by
others or at a later date (Boyd et al., 2003). Altruistic punishment
constitutes a social preference because of people’s tendency to act
in this way even outside of any clear benefit to themselves, with
people often punishing those who violate norms of cooperation
towards a third party (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a,b; Jordan
et al., 2014a).
Initial evidence suggested that individuals may exhibit less
altruistic punishment towards ingroup members (Bernhard
et al., 2006). It seems that the extension of positive regard
to ingroup members may lead individuals to punish ingroup
defectors more leniently due to greater feelings of warmth
towards them. This has also been explored through examination
of third-party punishment: third parties who observe a norm
violation are willing to incur costs to punish the norm violator
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004b). In
a group context, Bernhard et al. (2006) looked at group
membership and third party punishment in real groups in
Papua New Guinea and found that third parties gave more
lenient judgements to ingroup norm violators than outgroup
norm violators. Similarly, further recent work has found that
ingroup members are punished less than outgroup members
for misbehavior (Chen and Li, 2009; Mussweiler and Ockenfels,
2013). Most recently, it has been found that children punish
outgroup members more harshly than ingroup members (Jordan
et al., 2014b). Such results can be taken as indicating a
preference-based account whereby group membership may
moderate the use of altruistic punishment towards ingroup
members.
However, other work has suggested that group membership
moderates negative reciprocity preferences and altruistic
punishment in the opposite direction, where ingroup members
may be punished more for selfish behavior than outgroup
members. Goette et al. compared randomly assigned minimal
groups to randomly assigned real groups and found that real
groups punished ingroup defectors significantly more harshly
than did minimal groups (Goette et al., 2006). Similarly, it has
been found that participants who are cooperative in a gift-giving
game punish noncooperative ingroup members more severely
than they punish noncooperative outgroup members (Shinada
et al., 2004). Most recently, Mendoza et al. (2014) had participants
play as recipients in an UG, finding that participants exacted
stricter costly punishment on racial ingroup members than
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outgroup members (Study 1). In a second study they replicated
this effect of greater costly punishment towards college ingroup
members rather than outgroup members, and further found that
such punishment was magnified among strong college group
identifiers. Finally, a third study found evidence suggesting
that such group-moderated costly punishment was driven by
violated expectations of fairness from ingroup members. It is
therefore unclear exactly how group membership moderates
negative reciprocal preferences in intergroup contexts, and
future work is necessary to elucidate the conditions under
which ingroup members are punished to a greater or lesser
degree.
TYPE-DEPENDENT SOCIAL PREFERENCES
Perceived immorality seems to be particularly relevant to
intergroup type-dependent preferences. It is known that
intergroup conflict is characterized by a sense of moral
superiority: “we” are more honest, peaceful, trustworthy,
and friendly than “they” (Brewer, 1999). As the ingroup
becomes larger, older, and more established, the norms, rules,
and institutions that maintain cooperation often take on the
character of moral authority, which can lead to emotions of
denigration and contempt towards outgroup members (Brewer,
1999). Ingroup favoritism in economic games could therefore be
explained in part due to type-dependent preferences regarding
morality. Ingroup members are perceived to be more moral,
which increases the motivation to help them, while outgroup
members are perceived to be more immoral, affecting a person’s
preference to engage in prosocial behavior, leading to reduced
prosocial behavior.
Related to perceived immorality, outgroup members may
also be perceived as more threatening which is also likely to
negatively impact upon social preferences. Indeed, a primary
source of negative affect towards outgroups results from threat
of perceived incompatibility of their goals with ingroup goals
(Fiske and Ruscher, 1993). Work suggests that group membership
can moderate the perception of immoral others: immoral
outgroup members are seen as posing a realistic threat to
one’s resources and safety, while immoral ingroup members
are seen as posing a symbolic threat to the group’s image and
reputation (Marques et al., 1988; Branscombe et al., 1999).
In an intergroup context, it is known that group members
report less desire to interact with targets depicted as lacking
moral qualities, and that this is mediated for outgroup members
by perceptions of threat (Brambilla et al., 2013). Given the
central role that perceptions of threat play in intergroup conflict
(see LeVine and Campbell, 1972; and Sherif (1966) Realistic
Conflict Theory), it is likely that perceptions of threat to material
resources and safety will impact negatively upon prosocial
behavior in economic games, with players being selectively
prosocial towards ingroup members because they are seen as less
threatening.
Therefore, in addition to simple outcome-dependent
preferences and preferences for reciprocity, it is possible
that type-dependent social preferences concerning the perceived
character of other players also play a role in explaining prosocial
behavior in intergroup contexts. While this has received little
attention in economic games compared to other types of
preference-based explanations reviewed here, it seems plausible
that ingroup favoritism in economic games may in part result
from the perception of outgroup members as immoral, and
particularly as posing a realistic threat to one’s own resources.
BELIEFS IN INGROUP FAVORITISM
INTERDEPENDENCE OF OUTCOMES AND DIRECT RECIPROCITY
One influential belief-based account suggests that ingroup
favoritism in economic games can be explained as a result
of perceived outcome interdependence and expectations of
reciprocity. An influential early criticism of the ingroup love
account of ingroup favoritism in the Tajfel matrices was proposed
by Rabbie et al., who argued that ingroup favoritism in point
allocation was the result of beliefs about outcome interdependence
rather than social preferences (Rabbie et al., 1989). That
is, participants implicitly perceive their own outcomes to be
dependent on their choices: “by giving more to their ingroup
members than to the outgroup members—in the expectation
that the other ingroup member will reciprocate this implicit
cooperative interaction—they will increase their chances of
maximizing their own outcomes” (Rabbie et al., 1989, p. 176).
Indeed, work conducted in the years after Tajfel’s initial studies
documented that while social categorization can be a sufficient
condition for intergroup discrimination, this is by no means
a universal response, and can be extinguished by feedback
concerning how other members of the ingroup and outgroup
respond (Locksley et al., 1980). That is, learning that outgroup
members do not discriminate against one’s own group, and
learning that one’s own group does not discriminate against
the outgroup, both help to reduce discrimination. Beliefs
concerning the behavior of other group members are evidently
of great importance. According to Rabbie et al., participants
make ingroup-favoring allocations due to perceived outcome
interdependence: even if participants cannot allocate money to
themselves, they can give to others who may in turn reciprocate
their allocations. Rabbie et al. suggest that participants perceive
stronger outcome dependance with ingroup members, which
in turn leads to higher expectations of reciprocal behavior by
ingroup members. It is this, they argue, that leads participants to
allocate more points to ingroup members. Rabbie et al. concluded
that allocations in the Tajfel matrices were not motivated by
ingroup love but rather reciprocal expectations: the reciprocity
hypothesis (Rabbie et al., 1989).
Scholars have distinguished between two versions of such
a theory: a strong (unbounded) version and a weak (bounded)
version. In the strong unbounded version, participants attempt
to maximize their outcomes by allocating more resources to
others upon whom they perceive themselves to depend for
their own outcomes, anticipating that this favorable treatment
will be returned. This strong, unbounded, version makes no
claim concerning group membership: this can occur for both
ingroup and outgroup members (Stroebe et al., 2005). Since
individuals are more likely to engage in repeated interactions
with someone from their own social group, the weaker version—
the “bounded reciprocity hypothesis”—suggests that the effects of
reciprocity are bounded, or constrained, by social categorization
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(Gaertner and Insko, 2000). On this account, beliefs about
reciprocity are influenced by both group membership and
interdependence, such that people have higher expectations of
reciprocity from ingroup members, and this leads to ingroup
favoritism (Locksley et al., 1980). Applied to the minimal group
studies with which it was formulated, the bounded reciprocity
hypothesis suggests that participants who are dependent on
their ingroup for their own outcomes have stronger ingroup
reciprocal expectations and consequently make more ingroup-
favoring allocations in the Tajfel matrices than participants who
are not. In contrast, outgroup outcome dependance will not
lead to outgroup reciprocal expectations or to outgroup-favoring
allocations (Stroebe et al., 2005). Group membership, in other
words, moderates the effects of interdependence and reciprocity
in the Tajfel matrices.
In a series of experiments using artificial groups, Yamagishi
et al. have provided evidence suggesting that ingroup favoritism
in economic games occurs only when participants believe other
ingroup members will reciprocate the favor. Initial evidence for
this was provided when Yamagishi et al. conducted a partial
replication of Tajfel’s minimal group experiments using the
Tajfel matrices (Karp et al., 1993). In their study, they had
two conditions: a replication of the original minimal group
studies where the participant making the allocation decision
was also subject to allocation decisions by other members; and
a modified condition where allocators were told they would
be paid a fixed amount of money and that this would not
depend upon others’ allocation decisions. Their results revealed
that ingroup favoring decisions emerged when the subject was
also a target of allocation decisions by others, but not when
subjects’ payoffs did not depend on allocation decisions by
others. Such results speak against an (ingroup love) preference-
based account, which would predict ingroup favoring decisions
whether or not the participant could receive allocation rewards
from others or not. In contrast, such results support the
role of a distinct belief-based channel: that people only show
ingroup favoring decisions when they expect the favor to be
reciprocated. In a later study, it was found that participants
only acted more cooperatively in a PD when they believed
that the recipient had knowledge that the participant was an
ingroup member, consistent with the notion that cooperation
was driven by the expectations of ingroup reciprocity (Yamagishi
and Kiyonari, 2000). This is further supported by work from
Gaertner and Insko (2000), who had participants allocate rewards
in a minimal group paradigm but varied whether the other
allocator was an ingroup or outgroup member, and whether
participants would personally receive rewards or not. They found
that participants favored the ingroup over the outgroup, but
only when they were dependent on an ingroup member for
their own outcomes. Similarly, Stroebe orthogonally manipulated
participants’ dependance on an ingroup and an outgroup
member for outcome rewards in a modified Tajfel Matrices task
and found again that ingroup favoring strategies were strongest
with (but not exclusive to) outcome dependance on the ingroup
(Stroebe et al., 2005).
Work on expectations of reciprocity and interdependence,
then, supports a model where individuals respond to the
dependance structure and then reciprocate with favoritism
towards those on whom they are dependent, with this effect
considerably stronger for the ingroup (hence “bounded”) due
to the perception of the group as a “container of generalized
reciprocity” (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000; Stroebe et al.,
2005). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of cooperation in ingroup
favoritism has provided substantial support for this (Balliet et al.,
2014), with situations involving interdependence of outcomes
resulting in stronger ingroup favoritism in social dilemmas
(d = 0.42) compared to the weaker (but still significant) effect of
games with no interdependence of outcomes (e.g., DG; d = 0.19).
It is clear, however, that while important, interdependence of
outcomes cannot completely explain ingroup favoritism, for such
behavior is observed even in non-interdependent games. Why
might this be so?
INDIRECT RECIPROCITY AND REPUTATIONAL CONCERNS
Reputational concerns can lead to ingroup favoritism if group
members are strategically concerned with signaling a positive
reputation towards other ingroup members. That is, individuals
may believe that it is advantageous to selectively act prosocially
towards ingroup members when they can build a reputation
of being a prosocial person. In line with this, in more recent
years Yamagishi et al. have expanded on their earlier work
that primarily concerned the potential for direct reciprocity
(Jin and Yamagishi, 1997; Yamagishi et al., 1998, 1999), to put
forward their BGR Model. They suggest that the presence of
a salient ingroup activates a default group heuristic strategy,
which explains the higher incidence of prosocial behavior within
groups (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi and Mifune,
2008, 2009). The BGR model has three core ideas: first, that
humans evolved to have depersonalized and generalized trust
that other ingroup members will cooperate; second, that people
are motivated to establish and maintain a cooperative reputation
among ingroup members because of the strategic advantages
this brings; and third, that people expect to be the beneficiaries
of prosocial behavior from other ingroup members, but not
necessarily from the same ingroup members they cooperated with
or helped previously (Kiyonari and Yamagishi, 2004). On the
BGR account, people treat ingroup members more favorably than
outgroup members not because of ingroup love but because they
anticipate favorable treatment from ingroup members through
both direct and indirect reciprocity (Yamagishi and Kiyonari,
2000). Such beliefs concerning expectations of reciprocity can
be connected to stereotypes: group members believe that others
in their group are likely to act prosocially towards them, which
influences behavior. Awareness of these generalized norms of
reciprocity within groups, Yamagishi et al. argue, accounts
for observations of ingroup favoritism, particularly in social
dilemmas where one’s own payoff depends on the actions of
other group members. Note that for this account, the focus is
on the expectations of future rewards, rather than (as in the
preference-based accounts) a motivation to respond like-with-
like.
Evidence for this comes from work by Yamagishi and Mifune,
who found that participants only allocated more money to
ingroup members in a DG when they believed that others
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 15 | 12
Everett et al. Ingroup favoritism
knew their own group membership (Yamagishi and Mifune,
2008). Similarly, ingroup favoritism in a DG occurs only
when participants are exposed to reputation monitoring cues,
suggesting that it is adherence to norms of reciprocity and beliefs
about indirect reciprocity rather than ingroup love that drives
cooperative behavior within groups (Mifune et al., 2010). They
argue, therefore, that, such beliefs are necessary for ingroup
favoritism to occur in minimal groups: that “ingroup favoritism
does not occur when participants cannot or do not expect
favorable treatments from ingroup members” (Yamagishi and
Kiyonari, 2000, p. 127).
An important limitation of this current work on bounded
reciprocity is that it has largely focused on ingroup favoritism
in artificial groups. Will real groups exhibit the same behavior
in economic games as artificial groups? Individuals often
attach much importance to their social groups in real life, and
cooperation is commonly found in groups whose members
interact on a regular basis, have emotional ties to one another,
share a common frame of reference, and are behaviorally
interdependent—conditions absent from minimal group
paradigms (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Levine and Moreland,
1994). While a minor form of this ingroup attachment can be
generated in minimal group paradigms, it remains clear that
these minimal group memberships may not generate sufficient
attachment and emotional involvement to consistently affect
preference- or belief-based prosocial behavior in artificial
experiments. Indeed, people in self-selected real groups are
more cooperative in simultaneous dilemmas than were their
counterparts in minimal groups, and this effect is mediated by
group identity (Jackson, 2008). Such results are consistent with
previous findings linking group identification to cooperative
responses to a social dilemma (Kramer and Brewer, 1984; de
Cremer and Van Vugt, 1999). Recent work looking at beliefs
in ingroup favoritism has suggested that ingroup favoritism
can be explained by both beliefs and preferences: using real
university groups in a DG, participants transferred more to
ingroup members than outgroup members, but that this was
particularly so when the recipient knew the group membership
of the participant (Ockenfels and Werner, 2014). It is clear
that further research is needed to investigate the effectiveness
of the BGR model in predicting prosocial behavior in real
groups, where social identity processes are likely to be more
important.
COOPERATIVE NORM VIOLATION
A final belief-based explanation of group behavior in economic
games concerns social norms, whereby people act more
prosocially towards group members because they perceive that
to be the socially approved form of action and are aware of the
costs of violating such norms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a).
It is known that identifying with a group enhances adherence
to group norms (Terry and Hogg, 1996; Jetten et al., 1997),
and that group beliefs typically involve an injunctive norm
of cooperation: prosocial cooperative behavior toward ingroup
members is expected (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Identification
with a group not only increases the likelihood that one will
follow group norms, but also leads people to anticipate that
other group members are likely to follow such group norms
(Terry and Hogg, 1996; Mullin and Hogg, 1998), and indeed
cooperative responses in social dilemmas are more common if
cooperative responses by other players are also expected (Messick
and Brewer, 1983; Seinen and Schram, 2006). In addition to a
possible preference-based process where an individual internalizes
cooperative norms and acts prosocially accordingly (Kerr et al.,
1997), awareness of these norms and the costs of breaking them
may also lead to prosocial behavior via a strategic belief-based
process.
The anticipation that others will also follow cooperative group
norms is likely to bolster an individual’s own intention to follow
the social norm of cooperation lest they be seen as a deviant
group member and incur the associated costs. Social norms
are often infused with a moral dimension, and violations of
these norms are often accompanied by punishment from others
within the group (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). In other words, the
costs of acting selfishly in interactions with ingroup members
may be greater than the costs of selfish behavior with outgroup
members due to the existence of cooperative norms within
groups. Some evidence suggests that deviant group members are
punished more than deviant outgroup members. For example,
as discussed above with regard to altruistic preferences, research
has shown that participants who are cooperative in a gift-
giving game punish noncooperative ingroup members more
severely than they punish noncooperative outgroup members
(Shinada et al., 2004), and participants playing as recipients
in an UG exact stricter costly punishment on racial ingroup
members than outgroup members (Mendoza et al., 2014). Such
findings can be taken to support both preference-based accounts
concerning reciprocity, and cooperative norm violation. As we
shall repeat later in this review, the two processes are not mutually
exclusive.
Participants’ awareness of the costs of violating ingroup
cooperative norms may increase the likelihood of within-group
prosocial behavior. Support for this comes from Habyarimana
et al. (2007), who conducted a series of PGDs in Uganda where
participants sometimes played with ingroup members (“co-
ethnics”) and sometimes outgroup members (“non co-ethnics”).
In addition to finding evidence of ingroup favoritism, they present
results suggesting that such behavior can be explained through
a belief-based process whereby ingroup members cooperate
because they adhere to within-group norms, believing in the
power of sanctioning those who violate such norms.
PREFERENCES AND BELIEFS: SEPARATION AND
INTEGRATION
In this paper we have reviewed how decades of work on
ingroup favoritism has detailed experimental evidence strongly
implicating distinct roles for preferences and beliefs. Ingroup
favoritism is multiply determined: both preferences and beliefs are
important, and both play a role. The challenge now is to explore
these processes further, both in separation and in integration.
Theoretical and empirical separation of these processes is
essential in research seeking to explain ingroup favoritism, and
an important limitation of some commonly used economic
games is that they are often unable to isolate preferences
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and beliefs. For example, in a PGD any observed prosocial
cooperation could be explained in terms of preferences
(ingroup love; inequity aversion) or beliefs (adherence
to norm of reciprocity; reputational concerns), or some
combination thereof. Given this, researchers should attempt
to complement the use of these measures with those that
provide a tighter way to isolate the individual channels of
preferences and beliefs. For example, to explore social preferences
researchers could utilize decision problems with a single decision
maker who is tasked with distributing resources between a
group of people that includes both ingroup and outgroup
members. Another approach could be to compare one-shot
vs. iterated games, or compare anonymous with public games.
Such theoretical and empirical separation of preferences
and beliefs is necessary to allow a better understanding
of how, why, and when group processes affect prosocial
behavior.
At this juncture, the reader may question which of these are
more critical: are preferences or beliefs principal in explaining
ingroup favoritism? This is a natural question, but one that
is impossible to answer at present based on existing research.
While meta-analytic work by Balliet et al. (2014) has suggested a
stronger role for beliefs than preferences in ingroup favoritism,
it is also likely that in some circumstances preferences will be
more powerful. Moreover, in everyday situations both preferences
and beliefs work together as mutually enforcing. It is likely
that an individual with greater social preferences to help the
ingroup will also have stronger beliefs that facilitate this, just
as individuals with stronger social identification to a group
also exhibit greater belief in and adherence to the norms of
that group (Terry and Hogg, 1996; Jetten et al., 1997). As
Fehr and Schmidt (2006) argue, it is likely that prevailing
social norms affect participants’ preferences, such that long-
standing social practices are internalized and directly affect
social preferences. For example, stereotypic expectations (beliefs)
about a certain group being immoral are likely to reduce
the motivation to act prosocially towards them (preferences),
such that the resulting ingroup favoritism is a function of a
form of preferences over beliefs, where beliefs directly influence
preferences.
We suggest that group members are likely to show the
greatest ingroup favoritism in economic games where both
preferences and beliefs are able to influence behavior. Ingroup
favoritism is most likely to occur within real groups that
the participant has emotional attachment to (preferences for)
and where the situation involves injunctive cooperative norms
towards ingroup members, interdependence of outcomes, and
expectations of reciprocity from others (beliefs). Such a situation
can be seen as characterizing the “optimal” conditions in
which ingroup favoritism will occur. In contrast, eliminating
some of these channels (for example, using a minimal group,
or by excluding reputation building by making interactions
anonymous) will decrease the frequency of prosocial behavior.
For example, we would predict that ingroup favoritism would
be stronger in interdependent social dilemmas than in DG,
and particularly so when decisions are public and the groups
used are real-life groups that the individual strongly identifies
with. In contrast, it is likely that ingroup favoritism would
be at its weakest in DG (with no interdependence of
outcomes) played with minimal groups and where decisions are
private.
We further suggest that these factors can interact such
that preferences and beliefs reinforce each other and lead
to greater prosocial behavior than might be predicted from
the mere sum of their parts. Indeed, theoretical work on
psychological game theory has suggested that in addition to
simple preferences and beliefs, in some cases—for example,
guilt-, individual’s preferences can depend on beliefs (Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009). For example, if Jones transfers
less to Smith in a game than Smith was expecting, Jones
may feel guilty for letting Smith down (preferences), but the
extent of the guilt that Jones feels is likely to also depend
on how much Jones thinks that Smith thinks that Jones let
him down (beliefs). In this case, preferences and beliefs are
mutually reinforcing. Similarly, evidence suggests that beliefs
about the expectations of others are related to their type-
dependent preferences (Aguiar et al., 2009, Brañas-Garza and
Rodriguez-Lara, unpublished manuscript). With regards to
ingroup favoritism, it is possible that upon self-categorization as
a member of a group, depersonalization leads to ingroup love,
which may simultaneously reduce the greed motive in social
dilemmas by changing the focus from self-interest to group-
interest (preferences), while also establishing a role for beliefs
concerning direct reciprocity and interdependence of outcomes
and the need to preserve a positive reputation (beliefs). As these
beliefs are internalized, social identification with the group may
become greater, further increasing the likelihood of ingroup
favoritism. It would be fruitful for future work to directly examine
this hypothesis.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
Considering how preferences and beliefs shape ingroup favoritism
facilitates a more complete understanding of ingroup favoritism.
This division of preferences and beliefs is certainly not new
to social psychology, having echoes in the debate regarding
ingroup favoring tendencies in the minimal group paradigm
studies of the 1970s. We believe, however, that the explicit
delineation of preferences and beliefs in ingroup favoritism
provides new insights for future work in both social psychology
and behavioral economics. In this section we describe three such
integrative approaches. First, we describe how social psychology
has highlighted that not all groups are alike, and that the
specific content of beliefs (stereotypes) about groups and the
affective motivations (preferences) they engender differ across
groups, which is likely to influence prosocial behavior. Second, we
suggest that ingroup favoritism may be explained in part through
considerations of group reputation: a form of preferences over
beliefs. Third, we discuss how work on ingroup favoritism can
begin to incorporate other key insights from the social identity
approach, over and above social competition as intergroup
bias. Overall, we show how integration of theories from social
psychology with the preferences and beliefs framework provides
important new directions for researchers investigating prosocial
behavior in groups.
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THE DIVERSITY OF GROUPS
Behavioral economic research has tended to assume that
outgroups are perceived in the same (negative) way. But are all
outgroups the same? Social psychological work suggests not. If
we consider the range of groups about which we hold certain
beliefs, a vast array of beliefs can be observed: this group
is mean, another kind; that group in need of help, another
a threat; and so on. The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske
et al., 2002) holds that such stereotype content is captured by
two dimensions: warmth—linked to perceptions of common or
competitive goals—and competence—related to the target group’s
overall status in society. In their model, specific groups are
associated with different patterns of warmth and competence.
For subordinate, non-competitive groups (e.g., the elderly), the
positive stereotype of high warmth interacts with the negative
stereotype of low competence to maintain the advantage of
more privileged groups (a “paternalistic” stereotype). In contrast,
for high status, competitive groups (e.g., Jews) the positive
stereotype of their competence justifies the overall system but acts
jointly with negative stereotype of low warmth to justify overall
resentment (an “envious” stereotype). In the behavioral economic
lexicon, individuals have different beliefs and expectations about
the likely behavior of distinct groups.
What about preferences? The stereotype content model has
been extended by the BIAS Map (Behaviors from Intergroup
Affect and Stereotypes) (Cuddy et al., 2007), which proposes
that stereotypes lead to emotions, which then lead to behaviors
of discrimination and conflict. Warmth stereotypes determine
active behavioral tendencies, increasing or decreasing motivations
for active harm (harassing) and eliciting active facilitation
(helping), while competence stereotypes determine passive
behavioral tendencies, attenuating passive harm (neglecting) and
eliciting passive facilitation (associating). Such work highlights
that preferences (the emotions and motivations deriving from
stereotypes) and beliefs (the stereotypical expectations of
behavior from group members) are likely to interact in predicting
prosocial behavior, with each informing the other.
An informative direction for future research, then, would be
to explore the way in which beliefs and preferences associated
with different groups interact to elicit ingroup favoritism. There
has been a tendency in work conducted using a behavioral
economic methodology to explore ingroup favoritism towards
“generic” outgroups, and yet a wealth of research from social
psychology has highlighted that not all outgroups are perceived
alike. Such differential perceptions are likely to impact upon the
likelihood of ingroup favoritism being observed. Based on work
from the stereotype content model and the BIAS map (Fiske et al.,
2002; Cuddy et al., 2007), it is likely that ingroup favoritism is
likely to be more pronounced towards outgroups subject to an
envious stereotype, because such beliefs evoke feelings of threat,
defensiveness, and resentment. In contrast, ingroup favoritism
may be weaker in interactions with outgroups subject to a
paternalistic stereotype, due to the beliefs that such people are
kind but non-threatening. Such work would help to inform our
understanding of the psychological processes underlying ingroup
favoritism through demonstrating the way in which preferences
and beliefs interact in different contexts.
GROUP REPUTATION
Do individuals care about their group reputation, as well as their
own strategic individual reputation? We argue that they do, and
that this can be explained as a function of integrated preferences
and beliefs. As we have discussed, much work conducted in
behavioral economics and evolutionary biology has argued that
individuals may act in a prosocial way selectively to ingroup
members as a way of signaling that they have a good character
and resources to help others—that is, that they have good
evolutionary fitness and should be considered potential social
partners (Zahavi, 1975; Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund,
1998, 2005). This suggests that beliefs may drive this effect,
through individuals expecting that the probabilistic outcome
of interacting with the person that they helped at some point
in the future is significantly higher for ingroup members than
outgroup members. Aside from the expected tangible benefits
(e.g., receiving help in the future, or evolutionary success), is this
all that there is to reputational concerns? We argue that there
is more, and do so through integrating preferences with beliefs.
Reputation management occurs when a person cares about
another’s beliefs about some unobservable attribute of theirs and
then takes into account how their choices affect others’ beliefs.
What does “caring” mean? It could be interpreted as “caring” in
the sense of holding beliefs that it would be advantageous for the
other person to hold positive beliefs about you. On the other
hand, it could also implicate a role for preferences: aside from
probabilistic benefits, people might gain some intrinsic benefit
from having a positive reputation. We suggest it can refer to
both.
How might preferences connect to group reputational
concerns? Social psychological work in the social identity
approach suggests that through depersonalization, individuals
come to take on the interests of the group as self-interests
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987; Brewer, 1999).
Indeed, a key part of the social identity approach is that
individuals are motivated to preserve a positive social identity,
both to themselves and others. This, we argue, is connected to
reputational concerns: group members often act in ways that
will preserve the positive reputation of the group. On such a
preference-based account, individuals genuinely care about both
the material outcomes of the group as well as its reputational
identity. Combining these theoretical perspectives, we therefore
suggest that in addition to being concerned about their individual
reputations, people will also act in ways to preserve a positive
group reputation, even when there are no clear material gains
to be expected in the future.1 We call this the group reputation
hypothesis.
What evidence is there for the claim that through social
identity processes, individuals may seek to maintain a positive
group reputation? Particularly important is work on strategic
1It could be argued that such group-level reputation becomes a public good,
such that contributing to a positive group reputation creates a social dilemma.
On the other hand, such group reputation could be inextricably linked to
personal reputation, if by deviating from the positive group reputation one
is actually seen as less of a member of that group. Regardless, it remains an
interesting question as to exactly how individuals psychologically navigate
group reputation in intergroup prosocial behavior.
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helping: the claim that group members are motivated to signal a
positive identity for their group and that they believe prosocial
behavior can be an effective way of doing this (e.g., Nadler and
Halabi, 2006; Hopkins et al., 2007). Social psychological work
on helping in intergroup contexts has highlighted the strategic
role that such helping can have: prosocial behavior plays an
important role in social identity creation and maintenance, and
groups create, maintain, or challenge status relations through
helping (Nadler, 2002; Nadler and Halabi, 2006; Hopkins et al.,
2007; Nadler et al., 2009). Just as helping at the interpersonal
level can serve as reputation management (Nowak and Sigmund,
1998, 2005; Milinski et al., 2002), prosocial behavior has also been
posited as reputation management at the group level (Hopkins
et al., 2007). That is, group members may seek to perform
actions that they believe will induce outgroup members to see
ingroup members in the positive way that ingroup members see
them.
While intergroup signaling can lead to ingroup favoritism, it
is particularly interesting because it can also lead to the reverse:
preferential helping behavior towards outgroup members. When
individuals are motivated to signal the prosociality and kindness
of their group, prosocial behavior may actually be extended more
towards outgroup members. Hopkins et al. (2007) experimentally
tested the role of intergroup signaling in prosocial behavior
using the known stereotype of Scots as mean. After establishing
that Scots do indeed believe they are seen as mean by the
English and resent this stereotype, Hopkins found that Scots
believed that outgroup helping was a particularly effective way
of refuting this stereotype. It was found that increasing the
salience of the stereotype of Scots as mean resulted in an
increase in help volunteered to outgroup—but not ingroup—
members (Hopkins et al., 2007). Such results highlight that
helping others may be a means to advance a group’s interest
through social competition, and so intergroup signaling can
lead to group moderated prosocial behavior—though this time
outgroup favoring, rather than ingroup favoring. Indeed, the
potential for evaluation by another group can cause group
members to act more prosocially (van Leeuwen and Oostenbrink,
2005) and groups may actually compete to act more positively
towards the other and consequently gain a positive group
reputation (Jetten et al., 1996). As discussed above, in the
Stereotype Content Model, group stereotypes are organized along
dimensions of both warmth and competence (Fiske et al., 2002).
Prosocial behavior between groups serves as an effective way
of signaling to others that one’s own group is both warm
(i.e., moral, caring, friendly) and competent (i.e., having both
resources and ability), and so may be particularly well suited as a
form of reputation-management action. Such work suggests that
through depersonalization, individuals come to value a positive
group identity for its own sake (social preferences), as well as
anticipating that prosocial action is a way of achieving this, and
that positive reputations have strategic advantages (beliefs).
Our integrative approach shows how combining the concepts
of preferences and beliefs from behavioral economics with
the body of work conducted in social psychology on social
identity processes can lead to novel research directions. By and
large, behavioral economics has largely considered beliefs about
reputations at the individual level: an individual signaling to
another individual(s) that they are a good potential exchange
partner. At present it has neglected, however, work suggesting
that individuals also care about the reputation of their group
(distinct from their individual reputation) and will act in ways to
create and maintain a positive group identity through prosocial
behavior. Social psychological work highlights that in addition
to individual-level signaling, people also engage in group-level
signaling. On the other hand, work on the social identity approach
has often neglected the strategic role of signaling a positive
reputation, often conceptualizing it as a function of ingroup
love rather than its potential as a way of influencing outcomes
in future. It would therefore be fruitful for future research to
examine processes of group reputation signaling in economic
games.
SOCIAL IDENTITY STRATEGIES
Reflecting the state of the literature, most of the work reviewed
here has focused on the role of ingroup favoritism as a form
of group competition—intergroup bias—whereby people acting
more prosocially towards ingroup members provides objective
benefits to other ingroup members that (may) give them
an advantage compared to another group. Yet, as discussed
earlier, the social identity approach consists of far more than
just intergroup bias—it is a grand, overarching theory that
considers not just the individuals within a group but the social
structure within which group relations are explored (Ellemers and
Haslam, 2011). In particular, the social identity approach is often
misunderstood as suggesting that identification with a group will
always lead to intergroup bias where the ingroup is inevitably
favored over the outgroup—yet this is false (Ellemers and Haslam,
2011). Rather, the social identity approach requires appreciation
of the different identity strategies (individual mobility; social
creativity; social competition) that individuals may pursue to
achieve a positive social identity, as well as the specific structural
conditions relating to both how the group boundaries are
perceived and the objective possibility of change (permeability;
legitimacy; stability) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987;
Turner and Reynolds, 2011).
In this sense, research purporting to support other theories
of ingroup favoritism—e.g., the BGR model—perhaps should
not be taken to simultaneously provide evidence against a social
identity account. Such alternative findings are compelling, and yet
the extent to which they speak against a social identity account is
limited for the very reason that the “social identity” account such
results are compared against should best be considered a form of
“social-identity-lite”. That is, social identity theory offers much
more insight into intergroup relations than the mistaken claim
that identification with a group will always lead to intergroup
bias where the ingroup is inevitably favored over the outgroup
(Ellemers and Haslam, 2011). Social identity theory can explain
not just the diversity of groups, but also the ways in which ingroup
favoritism may or may not be manifested depending on the
structural characteristics of the intergroup context and the groups
involved.
Greater consideration of the social structure and context of the
groups will help to provide a fuller understanding of the topic
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at hand. To frame the issue in the behavioral economic lexicon,
what role do preferences and beliefs play in leading an individual
to adopt a particular identity strategy, and how might the social
structure impact upon one’s preferences and beliefs? It is not our
place here to present an entire proposal of research connecting
the social identity approach and ingroup favoritism, though we
do think that there are a number of places in which it may be a
good part to start.
One feature of the social identity approach that is clearly
limited in current research concerns the use of different identity
strategies in leading to ingroup favoritism in economic games.
For example, is it inevitable that individuals will always be
more altruistic towards ingroup members in these games? We
suggest that in some situations it is likely that individuals
may also employ the other strategies: social creativity and
individual mobility. How might maximization-based preferences
(e.g., ingroup love) interact with intragroup inequity-aversion
when in competition with each other? Would individuals
prefer their group to have more resources overall, or for
individuals in the group to have equal resources? Existing research
suggests that in a neutral setting in which no prescriptive
norm is externally imposed, welfare maximization is a stronger
motivation than inequity aversion (Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Capraro et al., 2014), yet it
remains unclear how this might be manifested in intergroup
contexts.
To what extent do people feel that they can leave their
group, and consequently engage in an individual mobility strategy
rather than a social competition-based ingroup favoring resource
allocation strategy? For example, some work has highlighted
that individuals will leave their group as a response to the free
rider solution (Yamagishi, 1988), suggesting that in some cases
individuals may be likely to engage in an individual mobility
strategy over social competition. For example, a weakly identified
non-religious (but ethnic) Jew may choose to leave the group,
rather than engage in ingroup favoritism against a more dominant
group. The use of this strategy is likely to be moderated by
the extent to which individuals can leave their group, and
the prior commitment and identification they feel towards the
group. To explore this, research might compare cases in which
group boundaries are relatively stable and legitimate (e.g., British
undergraduates, who apply for and enter their degree course to
study a specific subject), compared to those which are less so
(e.g., American undergraduates, who have flexibility to choose
and switch majors during the start of their course).
As another example, an important question for future research
could be to ask when might people seek to cognitively reinterpret
the giving situation, perhaps redefining selfish actions as being
better than ingroup favoritism? Are group members more likely
to exhibit ingroup favoritism when they perceive the group
boundaries as stable and legitimate? Research might explore this
through comparing ingroup favoritism in groups that individuals
elected to join (e.g., university; sports club) with those in which
they had no choice (e.g., parental income; ethnic background).
How might the status of the groups concerned impact upon
this behavior—for example, might high status groups exhibit less
ingroup favoritism towards low status groups than vice versa?
Research could explore this in a minimal group paradigm through
assigning the different groups varying levels of starting monetary
units, to create higher and lower status groups. One might expect
that low status groups exhibit greater ingroup favoritism than
high status groups.
While research has tended to neglect some of the core features
of the social identity approach, it does not necessarily need to do
so. In fact, considering the complete social identity approach will
help to shed light on a number of questions concerning ingroup
favoritism, thus being of benefit to researchers from all disciplines
working in this area. For this reason, greater consideration of
the social identity approach has the potential to be a useful
lens through which behavioral economists can examine research
questions, just as the behavioral economic approach provides a
useful toolbox for social psychologists.
CONCLUSION
In this review, we have demonstrated the importance of
disentangling preferences and beliefs in explaining ingroup
favoritism. We have shown how behavioral economic methods
provide a solid conceptual framework through which to examine
intergroup prosocial behavior, while also showing that this
perspective can be importantly enriched through consideration
of social psychological research and theory. We hope that
through this integrative review we inspire researchers working
in behavioral economics to make use of theory from social
psychology, while also inspiring social psychologists to make use
of behavioral economic methods.
We end by noting that it would be amiss to consider the
issue of ingroup favoritism as just a game that scientists play
(pun intended), with merely theoretical and methodological
implications of interest just to other scientists. Rather, this issue
is one that has far-reaching implications for society at large.
The ability of homo sapiens to cooperate and act prosocially is
undoubtedly one of the biggest—if the not the biggest—reasons
why our species has flourished. A physically rather weak species,
we have colonized the earth through cooperation and team work:
the development of liberal democracies, the invention of the
computer and the creation of life-saving drugs all arise from the
ability of our species to work together. Despite this, however, it is
clear that our cooperative tendencies still leave a lot to be desired.
In a globalized world, our parochially altruistic tendencies with
their roots in our ancestral past in the African savannah are no
longer adequate. To ensure the survival of our species in the face
of drastic and rapid climate change, poverty, population increases,
famine, war, and disease we need now—more than ever—to work
together across nations, ethnic groups, religious groups, and so
on. Psychology has a very real and important role to play in
exploring how we can encourage widespread cooperation across
group lines. As Martin Luther King, Jr said, “We must learn to
live together as brothers or perish together as fools.” (Speech in
St. Louis, Missouri, March 22, 1964: King, 1992).
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